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Abstract
We examine whether and when socially oriented shareholder activists use firms’ corporate social performance (CSP) to 
identify them as attractive targets for their activism. We build on the research in social movements theory and stakeholder 
theory to theorize how firms’ engagement with primary and secondary stakeholders reflected in their technical and institu-
tional CSP respectively allows socially oriented shareholder activists to identify targets. We develop a theoretical model by 
identifying corporate targets’ degree of (1) receptivity to and (2) need to comply with activist demands as two key dimensions 
of their corporate opportunity structure that explains the variance in firms’ attractiveness as targets for activist demands. 
We show that a firm’s technical and institutional CSP independently affect the likelihood of activists targeting the firm. We 
also show that our model has greater explanatory power at firms with high resource slack and from activists not identifying 
as socially responsible investment funds. Analysis of CSP and shareholder proposals data of 992 U.S. public firms over an 
8-year window of observation largely supports our theory.
Keywords Corporate opportunity structure · Corporate social performance · Stakeholder theory · Shareholder activism
Introduction
Organizations are embedded in a network of stakeholders. 
Organizational survival and performance are often aligned 
with how well they engage with and respond to stakehold-
ers’ varying demands (Godfrey et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 
2014). Increasingly, scholars have been drawn to study-
ing organizations’ interactions with a particular class of 
stakeholders—activists. While activists range from employ-
ees and labor unions to social movement organizations and 
shareholders, and employ varied tactics including boycotts, 
public protests, lawsuits and proxy votes, they all share a 
common objective of exerting pressure on organizations to 
extract concessions to their demands on financial, social and 
environmental issues (Eesley et al., 2016; Briscoe & Gupta, 
2016). Research has not only studied the different issues 
activists campaign for (Sine & Lee, 2009; Surroca et al., 
2013) but also the effects of targets’ responses on different 
financial and reputational outcomes (King & Soule, 2007; 
McDonnell & King, 2013).
Yet, research on a key aspect of firm-activist interac-
tion—how activists select the target organization—remains 
limited. As launching an activism campaign tends to be an 
expensive endeavor with potential financial, social and repu-
tational backlash, activists often evaluate the myriad factors 
that can make an organization a potent target. With its over-
whelming focus on shareholder activism as a form of mar-
ket discipline for poor financial performance (Karpoff et al., 
1996; Ertimur et al., 2011), prior research has shown firm 
size and firm performance to be two key markers that often 
guide shareholder activists’ choice of target (Goranova & 
Ryan, 2014). However, management scholars have recently 
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begun to draw on social movements theory to argue that 
social activists target firms that would be most receptive to 
their influence by invoking the concept of corporate oppor-
tunity structure – “the features of individual firms that make 
them more (or less) attractive to activists” (Briscoe et al., 
2014, p. 1787).
As selecting an attractive target is important for the suc-
cess of activist campaigns, we posit that corporate oppor-
tunity structure can benefit from a theoretical elaboration 
that encapsulates the dimensions of firms’ instrumental and 
normative motivations to concede to activist demands. In 
this study, we integrate insights from stakeholder theory 
on firms’ engagement with different types of stakeholders 
(e.g. Godfrey et al., 2009) with recent advances in social 
movements theory on social activism to present an elabo-
rated model of corporate opportunity structure, which offers 
a better understanding of how activists select their target 
organizations. We contend that socially oriented shareholder 
activists are likely to identify their targets by examining (1) 
firms’ self-interested or other-regarding orientation from 
their investments in engaging primary stakeholders (i.e. 
technical CSP), which captures firms’ degree of receptivity, 
and (2) firms’ normative and sociopolitical legitimacy from 
their investments in engaging secondary stakeholders (i.e. 
institutional CSP), which captures firms’ need to comply 
with activist demands. Specifically, we predict that socially 
oriented shareholder activists are more likely to target firms 
with technical CSP and less likely to target firms with insti-
tutional CSP. Furthermore, we extend our model by iden-
tifying firms’ slack resources and activist identity as two 
key boundary conditions that affect a target organization’s 
attractiveness to activists.
We test our arguments in the context of interactions 
between firms that engage in corporate social performance 
(CSP)—defined broadly as the principles, processes, and 
outcomes that positively relate to an organization’s soci-
etal relationships (Wood, 1991; Byron & Post, 2016)—and 
socially oriented shareholder activists. Specifically, we 
examine whether and when socially oriented shareholder 
activists target firms based on their CSP. As stakeholders 
vary in terms of power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitch-
ell et al., 1997), firms often choose to engage with certain 
classes of stakeholders over others. Thus, firms’ CSP due to 
their engagement with primary and secondary stakeholders 
reveals firms’ underlying motivations, and in turn, variance 
in their receptivity and their need to comply with socially 
oriented shareholder activist demands. Thus, this is a fer-
tile context to test our model. Using shareholder resolution 
data from S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we find 
empirical support for most of our model.
This research makes several contributions to theory and 
practice. First, we address a significant limitation in extant 
research on firm-activist interaction by theoretically clarifying 
why socially oriented shareholder activists view certain firms 
as more attractive targets than others (Briscoe et al., 2014). We 
refine the construct of corporate opportunity structure by offer-
ing a theoretically grounded model that explains how socially 
oriented shareholder activists infer not only firms’ receptiv-
ity to their demands but also firms’ felt need to comply with 
their demands, which aids in their target selection process. 
Furthermore, by identifying key firm- and activist-level fac-
tors that act as boundary conditions, we highlight the limits of 
corporate opportunity structures. Second, we also contribute 
to research on the consequences of firms’ investments in CSP. 
While the bulk of prior research has largely focused on either 
examining the relationship between CSP and corporate finan-
cial performance (CFP) (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Barnett & 
Salomon, 2006), or on the evaluations of other stakeholders 
such as the exchange partners, security analysts, or potential 
employees (Rupp et al., 2006; Cheng et al., 2014; Koh et al., 
2014; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Luo et al., 2015), we know 
little about how firms’ CSP is perceived by shareholder activ-
ists. Notably, recent research shows that activist hedge funds 
view firms’ CSR as a signal of wasteful use of resources to be 
minimized (e.g. DesJardine et al., In Press). By showing how 
and when CSP signals a potent corporate opportunity structure 
to activists, we highlight a hitherto underexplored consequence 
of firms’ CSP and challenge this conventional thinking in prior 
research. Finally, by illuminating firm and activist attributes 
that make socially oriented shareholder activism more likely, 
we provide executives and boards with greater understanding 
of a phenomenon of great importance. Recent research shows 
that executives go so far as to engage in corporate political 
activity to prevent socially oriented shareholder activist resolu-
tions from reaching a vote (Hadani et al. 2018). The insights 
revealed in the present research should help managers more 
effectively anticipate and respond to this growing concern.
We begin our theorizing by discussing the core tenets of 
socially oriented shareholder activism and corporate social 
performance. We then present a thorough discussion of the 
concept of corporate opportunity structure and highlight the 
limitations of extant research. In the subsequent sections, 
we offer our hypotheses by theorizing about the two dimen-
sions of corporate opportunity structure based on technical 
and institutional CSP and the two boundary conditions that 
shape our arguments. We then provide the details of our 
methods of analysis. Finally, we conclude with the discus-
sion of our results and their implications and contributions.
Theory and Hypotheses
Socially Oriented Shareholder Activism
Activism refers to shareholders’ and/or stakeholders’ 
efforts to influence firms’ actions typically with the intent 
Socially Oriented Shareholder Activism Targets: Explaining Activists’ Corporate Target…
1 3
of pressuring firms to alter their existing practices. Scholars 
have focused on either shareholder activism or social activ-
ism, conceptualizing the former as financially motivated and 
the latter as socially motivated.
Shareholder activism research draws primarily from 
agency theory (Goranova & Ryan 2014), which posits that 
the separation of ownership and control enables agents to 
engage in actions that do not maximize the interests of the 
principals (Fama and Jensen 1983). As such, shareholder 
activism has been highlighted as one of the control mecha-
nisms, which, through proposing and voting on resolutions, 
ensure managers steward organizational resources in share-
holders’ interests (Dalton et al., 2007). As early resolutions 
focused largely on “governance-based financial activism, 
seeking to improve governance structures and render man-
agers more accountable to firm shareholders” (Goranova & 
Ryan, 2014, p. 1233), shareholder activism acted primarily 
as a monitoring mechanism for disciplining inefficient or 
poorly performing firms that were failing to adequately stew-
ard shareholder value. Thus, firm performance and firm size 
became the key markers for shareholder activists to target 
firms (Karpoff et al., 1996; Ertimur et al., 2011)
Social activism research is grounded in the key tenets of 
social movements theory and stakeholder theory (Briscoe 
& Gupta 2016). Unlike shareholder activists, social activ-
ists agitate for broader social change beyond just the tar-
get firms. As such, scholars have sought to understand how 
activists, “not just content with merely hoping that firms will 
address their needs, nor with simply threatening (explicitly 
or implicitly) to withdraw from their exchange relationships 
with firms” (Briscoe et al., 2014, p. 1786), bring about posi-
tive social change through pressure on management (Davis 
et al., 2005). Such studies have examined how stakeholder 
groups use varied tactics ranging from public campaigns 
and boycotts to lobbying, and shareholder resolutions (Sine 
& Lee, 2009; McDonnell & King, 2013; Eesley et al., 2016; 
Luo et al., 2015). As influencing corporate policies via activ-
ist campaigns tends to be a highly risky endeavor in terms 
of time, money and the potential backlash (King & Pearce, 
2010), activists have been shown to examine the contextual 
conditions surrounding the target firm and mount an activ-
ism campaign when those conditions are likely to be more 
favorable to activists’ causes (Soule, 2009). Yet, unlike with 
shareholder activism, the factors shown to affect social activ-
ists’ target selection remain fragmented, lacking a coherent 
theoretical framework.
While research on shareholder and social activism has 
progressed along parallel paths, it is important to note here 
that these distinctions are not as clear cut as theory would 
suggest. Socially oriented shareholder activism offers an 
excellent context of activism transcending the distinctions 
in extant research. Socially oriented shareholder activism 
represents instances of shareholders, who scholars often 
describe as motivated purely by financial gain, using their 
ownership rights to advance social causes. Recent research 
shows that corporate leaders go to great lengths to avoid 
even having a shareholder vote on social issues (Hadani 
et al., 2018). However, as socially oriented shareholder 
activists seek to usher in broader social change, not only are 
the issues inherently diverse but they are also contingent on 
myriad factors that are likely to make such issues varyingly 
important to firms. In this study, we argue that a firm’s CSP 
shapes socially oriented shareholder activism campaigns’ 
target selection as it provides a very informative marker 
for the degree to which firms are likely to accommodate 
activists’ demands.
Background on Corporate Social Performance (CSP)
Scholars have extensively studied how CSP affects various 
firm outcomes (David et al., 2007; Godfrey et al., 2009). 
While the bulk of early studies examined the relationship 
between CSP and CFP (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Barnett 
& Salomon, 2006), recent studies have shown that CSP not 
only leads to higher CFP but also yields improved firm repu-
tation or brand image and insurance against future litigation 
(e.g., Koh et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2015). In this study, we 
examine whether firms’ CSP makes them an attractive target 
for social activism by signaling firms’ motivations to yield 
to activists’ demands.
Research on stakeholder theory has acknowledged the 
inherent variance among the many stakeholders in terms of 
their urgency, legitimacy and power vis-à-vis the focal firm 
(Mitchell et al., 1997), as reflected in the theoretical classi-
fication of stakeholders as primary and secondary based on 
their urgency and power over the firm (Freeman et al., 2007). 
Recent research has labeled CSP pertaining to primary 
stakeholders as technical corporate social performance and 
CSP pertaining to secondary stakeholders as institutional 
corporate social performance (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; 
Godfrey et al., 2009). In the following sections, we discuss 
in detail this classification of technical CSP and institutional 
CSP and present our model of the corporate opportunity 
structure concept to predict how socially oriented share-
holder activists differentially perceive firms’ technical and 
institutional CSP as potent signals about the extent to which 
firms are likely to accommodate their demands.
Corporate Opportunity Structure
Scholars explain social activists’ evaluation and selection 
process by drawing on the concept of political opportunity 
structure from the social movement literature, labeling it 
“corporate opportunity structure” in the context of advocat-
ing for corporate rather than political change (e.g., Briscoe 
et al., 2014). Defined as “consistent—but not necessarily 
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formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environ-
ment that provide incentives for people to undertake col-
lective action by affecting their expectations for success or 
failure” (Tarrow, 1994: 85), the concept of an opportunity 
structure was originally invoked to understand when and 
where social movements arise and eventually gain traction 
(e.g., Tilly, 1978). Thus, opportunity structures encapsulated 
any conditions that either facilitate or constrain the likeli-
hood of movement success, including the industry, regula-
tory policies, and national context (Campbell, 1988; Meyer 
& Minkoff, 2004).
In the context of firms, scholars have argued that firm-
level attributes act as important indicators suggestive of a 
corporate opportunity structure, which affects the degree to 
which social activists target the firm. For example, Briscoe 
et al. (2014) recently showed that employee activists are 
more likely to agitate to form lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender employee groups in firms led by liberal CEOs 
than in firms led by conservative CEOs as the employ-
ees perceive liberal CEOs as more receptive to their efforts. 
The authors theorized that CEOs’ political ideology acts as 
a corporate opportunity structure that signals firms’ recep-
tivity to employee activists’ demands and thus, aid in their 
target selection.
While this work is a landmark study that shows the utility 
of the corporate opportunity structure concept to employee 
activists’ target selection process, it stops short of offer-
ing a robust theoretical framework that can be utilized by 
social activists across contexts in selecting target firms. In 
the following sections, we theorize how socially oriented 
shareholder activists identify the target firms by examining 
firms’ technical and institutional CSP (Godfrey et al., 2009), 
which highlights two dimensions of corporate opportunity 
structure.
Dimensions of Corporate Opportunity Structure
Research on social activism has invoked the concept of cor-
porate opportunity structure primarily to convey the recep-
tivity of target firms to activist demands, which informs 
social activists’ target selection (King & Soule, 2007; 
Briscoe et al., 2014). However, as social activists’ objective 
is often to seek a broader social impact beyond the directly 
targeted firm (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016), we posit that the 
receptivity dimension alone might not fully explain activists’ 
target evaluation process.
We build on research on firms’ engagement with different 
types of stakeholders to expand the dimensions of corporate 
opportunity structure. An organization’s decision to engage 
with stakeholders is often a reflection of both the organiza-
tion’s—“beliefs, values, and practices that have evolved for 
solving stakeholder-related problems and otherwise manag-
ing relationships with stakeholders” (Jones et al., 2007, p. 
142)—that captures their self-interested versus other-regard-
ing orientation, and the organization’s legitimacy—external 
perceptions of organizations’ actions as “desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574). As such, we focus on how firms 
engage with their primary and secondary stakeholders that 
is reflected in firms’ technical and institutional CSP to theo-
rize that social activists’ success is likely to be contingent 
on selecting target firms that meet two criteria. First, they 
are likely to target those firms that signal their receptivity 
to activist demands (as noted in prior research on corporate 
opportunity structure). Second, they are likely to target those 
firms that are seen as deserving of being targeted given their 
reputation for engagement with stakeholders such that not 
only do the target firms experience a need to comply with 
activist demands but also voluntarily leads even non-target 
firms acquiescing to activist demands (to the target firms). 
Below, we develop hypotheses about how socially oriented 
shareholder activists select their target firms by focusing on 
these two dimensions of corporate opportunity structure 
reflected in firms’ technical and institutional CSP.
Technical CSP
Socially oriented shareholder activists are concerned pri-
marily with advancing social change (David et al., 2007; 
Hadani et al., 2018). Accordingly, they are more likely to 
prefer targeting those firms that they believe are not likely 
to engage merely in symbolic actions but rather in substan-
tive changes, which facilitates change beyond the targeted 
firm. We theorize that socially oriented shareholder activists 
are likely to discern firms’ preferences for substantive ver-
sus symbolic actions and in turn, firms’ receptivity to their 
demands by evaluating how firms manage their relationship 
with stakeholders.
Research notes that firms differ in the extent to which 
they embrace self-serving and other-regarding orientations, 
which affect their interactions with stakeholders. Specifi-
cally, firms face conflicting pressures of “traditional moral-
ity (obligation and duty, honesty and respect, fairness and 
equity, care and assistance) and market morality (self-inter-
est)” in managing firms’ relationships with stakeholders 
(Jones et al., 2007, p. 141). Reflecting these fundamental dif-
ferences in firms’ preferences, Jones and colleagues (2007) 
broadly categorize firms as self-interested economic actors, 
and other-regarding social actors (144–150). We posit that 
such a distinction manifests in firms’ preferences to engage 
with different types of stakeholders and in turn, affect social 
activists’ selection of target firms.
Firms with a self-interested orientation “emphasize short-
term wealth maximization over the methods for doing so” 
(Waldron et al., 2013, p. 402), and “regard the interests 
of stakeholders as important only to the extent that these 
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stakeholders can contribute to the firm’s short-term success” 
(Jones et al., 2007, p. 147) because they “perceive social 
responsibility as an unavoidable cost of the societal legiti-
macy underpinning their firms’ viability in markets” (Wal-
dron et al., 2013, p. 402). In contrast, firms that embrace an 
other-regarding orientation “try to take stakeholder inter-
ests into account, even when doing so does not appear to 
be in their self-interest—short or long term” and thus dis-
play “concern for all stakeholders and adherence to princi-
ples regardless of economic temptations to discard them” 
(Jones et al., 2007, p. 149). These suggest that as social 
welfare forms a central aspect of other-regarding firms, 
they are more likely to respond to activism with substantive 
changes to their operations than self-interested firms (Jones 
et al., 2007; Waldron et al., 2013). However, self-interested 
firms are likely to respond with nominal changes; the least 
response necessary to prevent damage to the firm’s standing 
without disrupting the firm’s core business practices (West-
phal & Graebner, 2010).
Given these, we predict that socially oriented shareholder 
activists will look to firms’ treatment of primary stakehold-
ers when evaluating potential targets firms. Primary stake-
holders are a subset of firm stakeholders “who are central 
to the operation of the business,” typically including cus-
tomers, employees, suppliers, and shareholders (Hillman & 
Keim, 2001). In contrast, secondary stakeholders are those 
less central to business operations, such as communities, 
the media, the government, and those acting on behalf of 
the natural environment. A firm’s dealings with primary 
stakeholders comprise the firm’s day-to-day operations, 
and as such are likely to be key for firms’ self-interested or 
other-regarding orientations (Waldron et al., 2013). Recent 
research has labeled CSP pertaining to primary stakehold-
ers as technical corporate social performance and CSP per-
taining to secondary stakeholders as institutional corporate 
social performance (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Godfrey 
et al., 2009).
We argue that high technical CSP indicates firms’ deci-
sions to incorporate social priorities into their core function-
ing. High technical CSP tends to be costly, because unlike 
more philanthropic forms of CSP (e.g., charitable giving), 
technical CSP is a commitment to spend more on every 
employee hired or every product delivered. Therefore, a firm 
with high technical CSP likely to have an other-regarding 
orientation than a firm with low technical CSP. We argue 
that activist shareholders are likely to view high technical 
CSP as a signal of firms willing to engage in substantive 
action in response to their demands, and hence, a strong 
corporate opportunity structure for socially oriented share-
holder activism. Thus, we predict that incidents of socially 
oriented shareholder activism will be higher at firms with 
high technical CSP than at firms with low technical CSP.
H1 Technical CSP is positively associated with subsequent 
socially oriented shareholder activism.
Institutional CSP
Socially oriented shareholder activists seek to gain a wider 
impact of their activism by aligning with changing prac-
tices across industries or economies than with correcting 
individual firm behavior (David et al., 2007; Briscoe et al, 
2014). We argue that they can better achieve that goal by 
targeting those firms that are seen as deserving given their 
engagement with secondary stakeholders that is reflected 
in firms’ institutional CSP. Such targeting is likely to result 
in social activists being seen as legitimate (Godfrey et al., 
2009). Furthermore, to motivate non-target firms to volun-
tarily acquiesce to activist demands (to the targeted firm), we 
argue that activists must convince external observers “that 
the firm belongs to some morally disfavored taxonomic cat-
egory” (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007, p. 910), making non-
target firms view the socially oriented shareholder activism 
as a potential threat to their legitimacy.
Defined as a generalized view that “the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574), legitimacy is pivotal 
to the growth and survival of organizations. In the current 
context, we posit that the degree to which external observers 
perceive firms as conforming to norms of social responsibil-
ity, which derives from both normative and sociopolitical 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Bitektine, 2011; Waldron et al. 
2013), affects firms’ response to social activists’ demands. 
We argue that to the extent firms’ pre-existing normative 
and sociopolitical legitimacy is tenuous, they are likely to 
perceive activism as a threat to their legitimacy, and in turn, 
are more likely to respond to activists regardless of their 
self-interested or other-regarding orientation (Koh et al. 
2014; Waldron et al. 2013). While a reputation for social 
performance is arguably more important to an other-regard-
ing firm, social approval is still important for self-interested 
firms, whose purpose of responding to activism is to “sig-
nal managers’ desire to maintain their firms’ societal legiti-
macy” (Waldron et al., 2013, p. 404; emphasis added) given 
that stakeholders are likely to withdraw their engagement 
with firms they perceive as having low levels of normative 
and/or sociopolitical legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Godfrey 
et al. 2009). Thus, we expect that firms with low levels of 
legitimacy attract more socially oriented shareholder activ-
ism than firms with high levels of legitimacy, as the former 
are more likely both to acquiesce and to prompt additional 
acquiescence from non-target firms.
We argue that firms with high levels of institutional CSP 
enjoy high levels of normative and sociopolitical legitimacy 
than their lower level peers. In contrast to firms’ treatment of 
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their primary stakeholders (i.e., technical CSP) that results in 
substantive actions by targeted firms, we contend that firms’ 
treatment of their secondary stakeholders (i.e., institutional 
CSP) results in non-targeted firms voluntarily conceding to 
demands made to the target firms (Mattingly & Berman, 
2006; Godfrey et al. 2009). Unlike technical CSP, institu-
tional CSP has little bearing on how firms interact with their 
exchange partners and thus has little bearing on firms’ other-
regarding orientation. Instead, institutional CSP provides a 
visible and finite commitment to promoting social welfare 
outside firms’ formal boundaries, which builds firms’ moral 
capital (Godfrey et al., 2009). Examples of institutional CSP 
include environmental cleanup or human rights initiatives 
(Jayachandran et al., 2013).
Technical CSP represents a more-or-less open resource 
commitment to fostering relational rather than transactional 
exchange with primary stakeholders, because primary stake-
holders are “infinitely greedy” (Campbell & Alexander, 
1997, p. 44; Hillman & Keim, 2001). In contrast, institu-
tional CSP represents a more fixed resource commitment 
not only because secondary stakeholders have specific, finite 
demands, but also because the purpose of building moral 
capital is to simply achieve a threshold level of legitimacy 
that will protect firms against possible threats (Koh et al., 
2014). Indeed, while technical CSP increases the exchange 
value of primary stakeholder relationships, only institutional 
CSP protects a firm’s legitimacy in the wake of a negative 
event (Godfrey et al., 2009). Thus, high institutional CSP 
predominantly reflects firms’ normative and sociopolitical 
legitimacy, irrespective of their other-regarding or self-inter-
ested orientations. As firms with high institutional CSP are 
less likely to feel the need to improve their legitimacy by 
complying with activist demands, and the non-target firms 
are less likely to find socially oriented shareholder activism 
against such firms credible, we predict that socially oriented 
shareholder activists are less likely to target firms with high 
institutional CSP than firms with low institutional CSP. 
Thus, we hypothesize:
H2 Institutional CSP is negatively associated with subse-
quent socially oriented shareholder activism.
Boundary Conditions
Thus far, we have presented arguments to highlight the 
two key dimensions of the corporate opportunity structure 
concept that encapsulates firms’ instrumental and norma-
tive motivations to acquiesce to activist demands, which in 
turn makes such firms an ideal target firm for socially ori-
ented shareholder activists. In the following sections, we 
identify resource slack and activist identity as two key fac-
tors that can affect the explanatory power of the corporate 
opportunity structure framework and develop hypotheses 
about their effects on the likelihood of socially oriented 
shareholder activism.
Resource Slack
Though firms with differing technical and institutional CSP 
may be motivated to entertain socially oriented shareholder 
activist demands, not all firms are equally equipped to act 
on that motivation. Firms often operate under significant 
resource constraints (Hillman et al., 2009), which can limit 
their ability to accommodate varied demands on resource 
allocation. As such, we argue that in evaluating the attrac-
tiveness of target firms, socially oriented shareholder activ-
ists should not only consider the potential target firms’ moti-
vations to acquiesce to their demands but also consider the 
ability to respond as captured by the availability of slack 
resources.
Complying with social activists’ demands typically 
requires significant resource allocation. The availability of 
fungible resources affects the likelihood of managers’ com-
pliance. The term “resource slack” refers to “resources held 
by the firm that can provide a buffer against economic tur-
bulence, provide funds for adaptation or finance strategic 
investments” (Martin et al., 2016, p. 10). Scholars have regu-
larly argued that the buffer created by resource slack enables 
managers to allocate resources to projects that deviate from 
or otherwise fall outside the scope of normal day-to-day 
business (e.g. March & Simon, 1958). Slack resources allow 
firms to experiment with new technologies or new product 
markets (Voss et al., 2008), focus on longer-term objectives 
(Mishina et al., 2004) and engage in more socially respon-
sible activities (Waddock & Graves, 1997). As such, slack 
resources facilitate deviation and expansion from a firm’s 
day-to-day operations.
Thus, while socially oriented shareholder activists may 
assess firms as ideal targets that not only engages in substan-
tive actions but also aids in the compliance of non-target 
firms due to their technical and institutional CSP respec-
tively, the extent to which those dimensions actually create 
an opportunity structure for socially oriented shareholder 
activism depends on the firm’s slack resources. For firms 
with high resource slack, shareholder activists can expect 
a firm with high technical CSP and low institutional CSP 
to respond substantively to socially oriented shareholder 
activism, allocating some of its slack resources to redress-
ing the shareholders’ grievances. Similarly, a firm with 
high resource slack, but with low technical CSP and high 
institutional CSP has the capacity to respond, but not the 
motivation. In contrast, for firms with low resource slack, 
the opportunity structure created by high technical CSP and 
low institutional CSP is reduced, because managers lack the 
capacity to substantively respond even though they have the 
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motivation. Thus, when resource slack is low, activists are 
not likely to perceive much difference in opportunity struc-
ture based on either technical or institutional CSP. Accord-
ingly, the effect of technical CSP and institutional CSP on 
socially oriented shareholder activism should manifest most 
strongly at firms with high resource slack.
H3 Resource slack strengthens the positive relationship 
between technical CSP and subsequent socially oriented 
shareholder activism.
H4 Resource slack strengthens the negative relationship 
between institutional CSP and subsequent socially oriented 
shareholder activism.
Activist Identity
Thus far, we have theorized that socially oriented share-
holder activists are guided by similar motivations in launch-
ing their campaigns against companies (Briscoe & Gupta, 
2016). In this section, we acknowledge the inherent variance 
among socially oriented shareholder activists’ motivations to 
target companies as different types of shareholders including 
religious organizations, unions, individual investors, pension 
funds, and socially responsible investment funds engage in 
socially oriented shareholder activism (Goranova & Ryan, 
2014; Tkac, 2006), and therefore, explore factors other than 
the likelihood of success as driving their decision to target 
firms with their demands.
Drawing on organizational identity research, which pos-
its that organizations’ actions reflect how they conceive of 
themselves (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), we contend that share-
holders for whom social issue activism forms the core of 
their identity, specifically the socially responsible investment 
funds, base the decision to target a firm with socially ori-
ented shareholder activism less on the likelihood of success 
at an individual firm, and more on the need to reinforce their 
identity. Based on attributes that are “central, distinctive, 
and enduring” (Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 265), organi-
zational identity guides organizations’ motivations and the 
actions they take (Livengood & Reger 2010, p. 49). March 
& Olsen, (2004, p. 3) note that action guided by a logic of 
identity reflects a “relatively complicated cognitive process 
involving thoughtful, reasoning behavior; but the processes 
of reasoning are not primarily connected to the anticipation 
of future consequences as they are in most contemporary 
conceptions of rationality.”
Socially responsible investment funds differ from the 
other types of shareholder activists in that social activism 
is their modus operandi, and is intimately linked to their 
organizational identity as an investment fund. The most 
frequent source of socially oriented shareholder activ-
ism proposals, religious organizations, identify far more 
broadly (Tkac, 2006). Presumably, even the fund managers 
responsible for engaging in socially oriented shareholder 
activism on behalf of the Catholic Church would not list 
corporate activism as the Church’s primary objective. 
Religious groups’ socially oriented shareholder activism 
objective is to enact real change at specific organizations. 
Similarly, unions largely focus on improving conditions 
for their own members, meaning the likelihood of success 
is an important condition for engaging in socially oriented 
shareholder activism.
Socially responsible investment funds engage in “in 
shareholder activism as a business, and this motivation 
distinguishes this group from the others” (Tkac, 2006, 
p. 6). While the ability to effect material change likely 
feeds into their identity and their value proposition to 
fund investors, socially responsible investment funds face 
an imperative to engage in socially oriented shareholder 
activism as an end in itself. Socially oriented shareholder 
activism proposals rarely achieve majority shareholder 
support, so corporate policy changes usually occur indi-
rectly as a result of the pressure placed on managers. 
Socially responsible investment funds certainly welcome 
such changes, but the indirect linkage between socially 
oriented shareholder activism and policy change makes it 
difficult for socially responsible investment funds to pre-
sent corporate policy changes as successes to their inves-
tors. In contrast, they can easily point to frequent use of 
socially oriented shareholder activism as justification 
for their investment. Ethically minded investors flock to 
socially responsible investment funds in part because of 
the funds’ socially oriented shareholder activism activity; 
“shareholder activism is part of the service being sold by 
these funds” (Tkac, 2006, p. 6). Thus, socially responsi-
ble investment funds can reinforce their identities through 
socially oriented shareholder activism, itself, regardless of 
the activism’s likelihood of success.
We argue that shareholder activists whose core identi-
ties revolve around socially oriented shareholder activism 
are less likely to target firms based on corporate opportu-
nity structure. Because social activism is central to socially 
responsible investment funds’ identity in a way that it may 
not be for the other major shareholder activist groups, 
socially responsible investment funds will be more likely 
than the other groups to engage in socially oriented share-
holder activism even if the prospects for policy change are 
weak. The very act of engaging in socially oriented share-
holder activism serves a core purpose for socially responsi-
ble investment funds in a way that it does not for religious 
organizations or other types of activists. Thus, we propose 
the following hypotheses.
H5: Socially responsible investment funds driven activ-
ism weakens the positive relationship between technical CSP 
and subsequent socially oriented shareholder activism
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H6: Socially responsible investment funds driven activ-
ism weakens the negative relationship between technical 
CSP and subsequent socially oriented shareholder activism
Methods
The data for this study were drawn from the Kinder, Lyd-
enberg, Domini, and Company (KLD), ISS (formerly 
RiskMetrics) Shareholder Proposals, Corporate Library, 
Execucomp, and Compustat databases. KLD is the most 
widely used data on corporate social performance (David 
et al., 2007). KLD data are drawn from multiple sources 
including annual reports, annual surveys, proxy state-
ments, news articles, reports by third parties and academic 
articles. Firms are rated on several categories including 
employee relations, products, community relations, envi-
ronmental performance, diversity issues, and human rights 
issues. Within each category, KLD identifies “strengths” 
and “concerns”, for which every firm is given a score of 
“1” or “0” based on the presence or absence of the strength 
or concern, respectively. The ISS Shareholder Proposals 
database details resolutions proposed by shareholders. 
Financial data were drawn from the COMPUSTAT data-
base, and governance data were drawn from the Corporate 
Library and Execucomp databases. We matched availa-
ble data on 992 firms and 6,540 firm-year observations 
across these databases between the years 2002 and 2009. 
We selected this window of observation for two primary 
reasons. First, KLD’s coverage of firms and measures 
employed changed substantially in 2002 and even more so 
in 2010, while remaining relatively stable in between (Hart 
& Sharfman, 2015). Specifically, in 2002 KLD expanded 
coverage to roughly three times the number of firms pre-
viously covered. In 2010, ownership and management of 
KLD had changed hands, along with a considerable alter-
ation to KLD’s inventory of variables (e.g., Chin et al., 
2013). Second, this window of observation (or very proxi-
mal ones) is pervasive in the literature, even among recent 
works (e.g., Gras & Krause, 2020). As such, employing a 
similar time frame allows us to make direct comparisons 
and extensions to extant work on the subject.
Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable in this study is firm-level 
socially oriented shareholder activism, used in Hypotheses 
1–4. Examples of socially oriented proposals in the dataset 
include calls for the adoption of anti-discrimination poli-
cies, the production of a report on the firm’s human rights 
record, and implementation of International Labor Organi-
zation standards. In order to capture socially oriented 
shareholder activism, we created a count variable for the 
number of socially oriented proposals in each firm-year 
observation. We then adjusted this count by the industry 
average. Industry-adjusting the count offers two benefits. 
First, it accounts for any industry-specific variance in the 
dependent variable (Sharp et al., 2013). Second, it makes 
the dependent variable continuous and normally distrib-
uted, enabling the use of more straightforward types of 
analysis (Greene, 2008). We industry-adjusted the socially 
oriented shareholder activism count by subtracting the 
mean number of socially oriented shareholder activism 
proposals across all firms in the same 2-digit SIC category 
and year.
The second and third dependent variables in this study are 
socially oriented shareholder activism initiated by socially 
responsible investment funds and socially oriented share-
holder activism initiated by non-socially responsible invest-
ment funds. For each proposal, ISS identifies the sponsor by 
a type. The most common types include socially responsi-
ble investment funds, unions, traditional investment funds, 
individuals, and religious organizations. Socially oriented 
shareholder activism by socially responsible investment 
funds is operationalized through a count of the number of 
socially oriented shareholder activism proposals initiated by 
socially responsible investment funds, and socially oriented 
shareholder activism by non-socially responsible investment 
funds is the count of the remaining socially oriented share-
holder activism proposals in each firm-year. Both counts 
were industry-adjusted within 2-digit SIC category and year. 
To establish causal priority, all dependent variables were 
measured one year subsequent to predictor variables. We 
also Winsorized all dependent variables at the highest and 
lowest one percent of values to mitigate the potential influ-
ence of outliers.
Independent Variables
CSP is commonly measured by subtracting concerns from 
strengths in the KLD categories of community, diver-
sity, employee relations, environment, corporate govern-
ance, human rights, and product (e.g. David et al., 2007). 
Strengths capture firm actions perceived to increase social 
welfare (e.g. philanthropic donations), whereas concerns 
capture firm actions perceived to decrease social welfare 
(e.g., safety violations). Our first independent variable, used 
in Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 is technical CSP. Consistent with 
prior research (Godfrey et al., 2009), we operationalize tech-
nical CSP through an additive measure of firm strengths 
minus concerns in the KLD categories of Employee Rela-
tions and Product, given the continual economic exchanges 
with employees and customers. The second independent 
variable, used in Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6, is institutional CSP. 
We operationalize institutional CSP through an additive 
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measure of firm strengths minus concerns in the KLD cat-
egories of Community, Diversity, Environment, and Human 
Rights, which fit the conceptual definition of institutional 
CSP, given that the focal stakeholders in these categories 
are not engaged in regular exchange with the organization 
(Godfrey et al., 2009; see also Jayachandran et al., 2013).
Our moderator variable, used in testing Hypotheses 3 and 
4, is Resource Slack. Resource slack consists of resources 
that are liquid and available for making strategic investments 
(Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998). We operationalized resource 
slack as the total of firm’s cash and short-term securities 
(Martin et al., 2016). This variable is logged due to its 
magnitude, and mean-centered prior to analysis to reduce 
collinearity.
Control Variables
Following prior research (Russo & Fouts, 1997; McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2000), we control for several factors linked to both 
CSP and activism including R&D intensive operationalized 
as expenditures on R&D divided by revenue, advertising 
intensity operationalized as advertising expenditures divided 
by revenue (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2000), capital inten-
sity measured as the ratio of assets to sales (Russo & Fouts, 
1997), and firm’s debt ratio operationalized as the book 
value of long-term debt to total book value of stockholders’ 
equity in order to capture a firm’s financial risk (Graves & 
Waddock, 1994). We control for firm size captured by firm 
assets (logged), firm performance captured as the return on 
assets (ROA) (Goranova & Ryan, 2014), Total Shareholder 
Returns calculated as the market value of the firm (share 
price multiplied by shares outstanding) plus dividends, 
divided by the previous year’s market value.
We further control for the strength of the firm’s corporate 
governance mechanisms, as firms with lax governance are 
potentially more likely to garner attention from shareholder 
activism. We identify if the board is chaired by (a) a CEO/
chair (omitted category in models), (b) a former CEO chair, 
or (c) an independent chair (Krause & Semadeni, 2013). 
Board independence is calculated as the ratio of independ-
ent outside directors to total board members (Dalton et al., 
1998). CEO incentive pay is the percentage of total CEO 
compensation that is incentive-based. CEO ownership is the 
percentage of shares outstanding that are owned by the CEO. 
As our data are a panel of multiple firms across multiple 
years, we also include year dummies to account for macro-
economic conditions (Certo & Semadeni, 2006).
Estimation Methods
We used the generalized estimating equations (GEE) method 
developed by Liang & Zeger (1986) to test Hypotheses 
1–4. This modeling procedure effectively accounts for both 
unobserved differences among firms and intertemporal non-
independence (Henderson et al., 2006). GEE requires the 
specification of a link function, a distribution family, and an 
error correlation structure (Ballinger, 2004). As our depend-
ent variable is normally distributed and continuous, we spec-
ified a Gaussian distribution family and identity link func-
tion. With our relatively limited observation window and the 
absence of auto-correlation, we chose an interchangeable 
error correlation structure.
Testing Hypotheses 5 and 6 required a method capable 
of empirically testing the differences in coefficients across 
two models predicting two different dependent variables. 
Specifically, we require the capability of testing whether the 
coefficient for technical CSP (institutional CSP) predicting 
socially oriented shareholder activism by socially responsi-
ble investment funds is statistically stronger or weaker than 
the coefficient for technical CSP (institutional CSP) predict-
ing socially oriented shareholder activism initiated by non-
socially responsible investment funds. Seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) offers the ability to simultaneously model 
two equations and to run post-hoc Wald tests to compare 
the coefficients (Zellner, 1962). Thus, we use SUR to test 
Hypotheses 5 and 6.
Results
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and cor-
relations for the variables of interest. Table 2 includes a 
controls-only model (Model 1), separate models includ-
ing each of technical CSP and institutional CSP (Models 
2 and 3), a model with technical CSP and institutional CSP 
together (Model 4), separate models for interactions between 
technical CSP and slack (Model 5) and institutional CSP and 
slack (Model 6), and a full model that includes all of the 
above (Model 7). Table 3 includes the results from our SUR 
models. The control equations for our two dependent vari-
ables (socially oriented shareholder activism by non-socially 
responsible investment funds and socially oriented share-
holder activism by socially responsible investment funds) 
were simultaneously calculated and are presented in Model 
8. The full models were simultaneously calculated and are 
presented in Model 9.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that technical CSP is positively 
associated with subsequent socially oriented shareholder 
activism. As presented in Model 2, the coefficient for tech-
nical CSP is positive and significant (β = 0.01, p < 0.05). 
The coefficient for technical CSP in Model 4 (which also 
includes institutional CSP) corroborates this result (β = 0.02, 
p < 0.05). Thus, we find we find support for the positive 
relationship between technical CSP and socially oriented 
shareholder activism. Hypothesis 2 predicts that institu-
tional CSP is negatively associated with subsequent socially 
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oriented shareholder activism. As presented in Model 3, the 
coefficient for institutional CSP is negative and significant 
(β = −0.03, p < 0.01). The coefficient for institutional CSP 
in Model 4 corroborates this result (β = −0.04, p < 0.01). 
Thus, we find support for the negative relationship between 
institutional CSP and socially oriented shareholder activism.
Support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 suggests that 
strongest socially oriented shareholder activism target is the 
Table 2  GEE models predicting socially oriented shareholder activism





Significance tests are two-tailed
Year dummies omitted for parsimony
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Size 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Performance 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
TSR −0.05* −0.05* −0.06* −0.05* −0.05* −0.05* −0.05*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R&D Intensity −0.36+ −0.39* −0.32+ −0.36+ −0.38* −0.34+ −0.36+
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Adv. Intensity −0.38 −0.50 −0.14 −0.25 −0.26 −0.19 −0.19
(0.84) (0.84) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.82)
Capital Intensity −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Debt Ratio −0.00** −0.00** −0.00** −0.00** −0.00** −0.00** −0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Former CEO −0.06* −0.06* −0.05+ −0.05+ −0.05+ −0.05+ −0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Independent −0.06 −0.06 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Board Indep. −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Incentive Pay 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Ownership −0.53 −0.52 −0.52 −0.50 −0.49 −0.52 −0.52
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Slack 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Technical CSP 0.01* 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Institutional CSP −0.03** −0.03** −0.04** −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Technical CSP X slack 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00)
Institutional CSP X slack −0.02** −0.02**
(0.00) (0.01)
Wald χ2 196.99*** 201.66*** 209.59*** 217.10*** 230.66*** 228.96*** 249.84***
Δ Wald χ2 4.67* 12.60*** 20.11*** 13.56*** 11.86*** 32.74***
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firm with high technical CSP and low institutional CSP and 
the weakest socially oriented shareholder activism target 
is the firm with low technical CSP and high institutional 
CSP, with the remaining combinations in the middle. Our 
results support this expectation. The predicted value for 
industry-adjusted socially oriented shareholder activism for 
a firm with technical CSP one standard deviation above the 
mean and institutional CSP one standard deviation below 
the mean is 0.12. Conversely, the predicted value for a firm 
with technical CSP one standard deviation below the mean 
and institutional CSP one standard deviation above the mean 
is −0.05. Firms that are high on both dimensions have a pre-
dicted value of 0.02, and firms that are low on both dimen-
sions have a predicted value of 0.04. These predicted values 
provide further support to our underlying theory.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that resource slack strengthens the 
positive relationship between technical CSP and subsequent 
socially oriented shareholder activism. Model 5 shows that 
the coefficient for the interaction term between technical 
CSP and slack is positive and significant (β = 0.01, p < 
0.01), supporting Hypothesis 3. The full model, Model 7, 
also shows a positive and significant effect for the interac-
tion term (β = 0.01, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 4 predicts that 
resource slack strengthens the negative relationship between 
institutional CSP and subsequent socially oriented share-
holder activism. Model 6 shows that the coefficient for the 
interaction term between institutional CSP and slack is 
negative and significant (β = −0.02, p < 0.01), supporting 
Hypothesis 4. The full model, Model 7, shows the same (β 
= −0.02, p < 0.01).
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the positive relationship 
between technical CSP and subsequent socially oriented 
shareholder activism is weaker for socially oriented share-
holder activism initiated by socially responsible investment 
funds than by other types of activist shareholder. We employ 
seemingly unrelated regression to compare the coefficients 
of technical CSP and institutional CSP across equations with 
different dependent variables (socially oriented shareholder 
activism by socially responsible investment funds versus 
socially oriented shareholder activism by non-socially 
responsible investment funds). As shown in Model 9, and 
contrary to our prediction, the coefficient for technical CSP 
predicting Non-socially responsible investment fund socially 
oriented shareholder activism (β = 0.00) is lower than that 
predicting socially responsible investment fund socially 
oriented shareholder activism (β = 0.02). The Wald test 
confirms that the coefficients are significantly different (χ2 
=8.48, p < 0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported, and 
in fact, the opposite relationship is supported.
Hypothesis 6 predicts the negative relationship between 
institutional CSP and subsequent socially oriented share-
holder activism is weaker for socially oriented shareholder 
activism initiated by socially responsible investment funds 
Table 3  SUR models predicting socially oriented shareholder activ-
ism by socially responsible investment fund and non-socially respon-
sible investment fund
* p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
***p < .001
+ p < 0.10
n=3751
Significance tests are two-tailed
Year dummies omitted for parsimony
Model 8 Model 9
DV: Non-
SRIF
DV: SRIF DV: Non-
SRIF
DV: SRIF
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Size 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Performance 0.14 0.37** 0.19+ 0.35**
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
TSR −0.04+ −0.02 −0.05* −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R&D inten-
sity
−0.35** −0.09 −0.20+ −0.08
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Adv. intensity 0.35 0.81** 0.85* 0.86**
(0.40) (0.29) (0.40) (0.29)
Capital inten-
sity
−0.00** −0.00* −0.00** −0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Debt ratio −0.00* 0.00 −0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Former CEO −0.04+ −0.03+ −0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Independent −0.03 −0.05* −0.03 −0.04*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Board indep. 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Incentive pay 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Ownership −0.47 −0.62** −0.41 −0.56**
(0.29) (0.21) (0.29) (0.21)
Slack 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.04***









Wald χ2 693.66** 516.96** 789.90** 564.80**
Δ Wald χ2 96.24** 47.84**
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than by other types of activist shareholder. As shown in 
Model 9, the coefficient for institutional CSP predicting 
socially oriented shareholder activism from socially respon-
sible investment fund (β = −0.02, p < 0.01) is lower than for 
the coefficient predicting socially oriented shareholder activ-
ism from non-socially responsible investment fund (−0.06; 
p < 0.01). The Wald test confirms that the coefficients differ 
significantly (χ2 = 23.21, p < 0.01). Thus, we find support 
for Hypothesis 6.
Addressing Possible Endogeneity
We acknowledge concern about endogeneity, possibly due 
to reverse-causality or omitted variables bias. Thus, we con-
ducted the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Baum, 2006). The 
instruments for such a test should be (1) strong (i.e. predic-
tive of the instrumented variable) and (2) exogenous (i.e. 
only indirectly related to the dependent variable through the 
instrumented variable) (Semadeni et al., 2014). We instru-
mented technical CSP and institutional CSP with the mean 
level of overall CSP in an industry (determined by two-digit 
SIC codes) and the firm’s R&D intensity. As the industry 
mean is naturally exogenous (e.g. Germann et al., 2015), it 
is a commonly accepted instrumentation method, and prior 
research has indicated that firms with higher R&D intensity 
also tend to exhibit higher CSP (e.g. Padgett & Galan, 2010). 
Therefore, we consider these two instruments theoretically 
justified.
Each instrument positively and significantly predicts 
both technical CSP (F = 29.61, p < 0.001) and institutional 
CSP (F = 53.40, p < 0.001), exhibiting F scores well above 
acceptable thresholds for instrument strength (Semadeni 
et al., 2014). The Sargan test revealed that the instruments 
are exogenous in instrumenting both technical CSP (χ2 = 
1.42, p = 0.23) and institutional CSP (χ2 = 1.65, p = 0.20). 
The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests suggest that the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity could not be rejected for either 
technical CSP (F = 0.27, p = 0.60) or institutional CSP (F 
= 0.05, p = 0.82). Thus, we found no evidence that endo-
geneity was a concern in our models. Notably, even though 
endogeneity is not biasing our models, the effects of the 
independent variables on socially oriented shareholder activ-
ism retained their direction, magnitude, and significance in 
the instrumented models.
Post‑Hoc Tests
We conducted additional tests to explore the robustness and 
validity of our findings. First, we checked our models for the 
presence of multicollinearity. The mean VIFs were all below 
1.5, and the highest VIF was below 2.6, suggesting that mul-
ticollinearity is not a concern. Second, whereas in our origi-
nal models we lagged our predictors one year behind our 
dependent variables, we were concerned that a year might 
be too much temporal distance between hypothesized cause 
and effect. As such, we ran our models with concurrent 
independent and dependent variables, and obtained nearly 
identical results. Third, we substituted number of employees 
to measure firm size and ROE to measure firm performance. 
The coefficients and significance levels remained equivalent. 
Lastly, we explored the possibility of curvilinear effects by 
including squared terms of our independent variables in the 
models; they produced insignificant results, suggesting that 
the relationships we found were not curvilinear.
Discussion
Scholars have long sought to understand the relationships 
firms have with their stakeholders. Increasingly, research 
has focused on studying how various stakeholders includ-
ing employees, shareholders, and social activists engage in 
activism to bring about changes in the firms they target, and 
the heterogeneity in firms’ responses to such activism (Wal-
dron et al., 2013; Briscoe & Gupta, 2016). Yet, our under-
standing of how social activists select their target organiza-
tions remains limited. In this study, we sought to address 
this issue by invoking the concept of corporate opportunity 
structure from the social movements theory and offering a 
more nuanced theoretical grounding of the construct.
We began developing our arguments around a key tenet 
of social movement theory, which is that activists are more 
likely to target those companies that signal their receptiv-
ity to activist demands, thereby increasing the corporate 
opportunity structure for activism (Briscoe et al., 2014). 
As socially oriented shareholder activists are more likely to 
be motivated to bring about social changes beyond merely 
the targeted firm than to improve financial performance, we 
posited that they are likely to target those firms where they 
perceive the greatest likelihood of success. Yet, as firms’ 
actions are often a function of both internal preferences of 
managers and their responses to external pressures (Liven-
good & Reger, 2010; Chin et al., 2013), we argued that mere 
receptivity of firms to activist demands fails to capture their 
proclivities in response to external pressures.
As such, we drew on recent conceptual discussions (Jones 
et al., 2007; Waldron et al., 2013) to develop two salient 
dimensions of corporate opportunity structure by theorizing 
about the role of firms’ technical CSP (i.e. their interactions 
with primary stakeholders), which reflects their receptivity 
to activist demands and institutional CSP (i.e. their inter-
actions with secondary stakeholders), which reflects firms’ 
normative and sociopolitical legitimacy shaping their need to 
comply (e.g., Godfrey et al., 2009). Specifically, we argued 
that social activists are likely to discern firms’ self-inter-
ested or other-regarding orientation from their investments 
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in engaging primary stakeholders (i.e. technical CSP), and to 
discern firms’ normative and sociopolitical legitimacy from 
their investments in engaging secondary stakeholders (i.e. 
institutional CSP). We predicted technical CSP to be associ-
ated with higher socially oriented shareholder activism and 
institutional CSP with lower socially oriented shareholder 
activism, and our results supported these predictions.
These results have significant implications for future 
research on social activism. By showing the differential 
effects firms’ receptivity and need-to-comply have on the 
likelihood of being targeted with socially oriented share-
holder activism, we offer theoretical clarity to the concept 
of corporate opportunity structure. Furthermore, the two 
dimension we offered suggest that when socially oriented 
shareholder activists target firms, they need not be passive 
actors at the receiving end of activism, but rather, can be 
proactive in managing their engagements with different 
stakeholders by being cognizant of the signals such engage-
ments convey. Finally, these results temper the emerging 
narrative about the many different favorable outcomes of 
engaging in socially responsible behavior by featuring a 
unique context where such engagements may engender sub-
sequent activism.
We also identified firms’ slack resources as an important 
boundary condition that shapes the relationship between our 
proposed opportunity structure and subsequent socially ori-
ented shareholder activism. Arguing that the availability of 
slack resources allows firms to invest in social issues, and 
as such, aids them to act on their receptivity to and need to 
comply with activist demands, we predicted that the greater 
the slack resources firms have, the stronger the effect of tech-
nical CSP and institutional CSP on socially oriented share-
holder activism. Our results support Hypotheses 3 and 4, and 
show how firms’ slack resources affects activists’ proclivity 
to launch socially oriented shareholder activism campaigns.
Finally, we examined how activist identity as a key moti-
vating factor that guides socially oriented shareholder activ-
ists’ activism efforts. We argued that those activists whose 
identities are tightly coupled with the causes they espouse, 
such as socially responsible investment funds, are less likely 
than others to engage in activism guided solely by the likeli-
hood of success, because activism reinforces their identity 
regardless of the corporate opportunity structure (e.g., Ash-
forth & Mael, 1989). Thus, Hypotheses 5–6 predicted that 
socially oriented shareholder activism initiated by socially 
responsible investment funds is less dependent on firms’ 
social identity and social legitimacy, respectively, than is 
socially oriented shareholder activism initiated by other 
activist types.
As the coefficient is significant in the opposite direc-
tion, Hypothesis 5 is not supported, which highlights a key 
theoretical implication. This finding suggests that given the 
significant costs involved in mounting an activism campaign 
(Briscoe et al., 2014; Eesley et al., 2016), the receptivity of 
firms to activist demands reflected in firms’ technical CSP 
not only remains a key consideration for socially responsible 
investment funds, but actually is a more salient concern than 
it is for non-socially responsible investment fund activists. 
In contrast, we did find empirical support for Hypothesis 
6. This suggests that the socially responsible investment 
fund identity weakens the relevance of firms’ normative 
and sociopolitical legitimacy in predicting socially oriented 
shareholder activism.
On the one hand, these results support our focus on 
activist identity as a contingency factor moderating the 
importance of firms’ orientation and legitimacy as dimen-
sions of the corporate opportunity structure. The diver-
gence in effects, which we did not predict, also reinforces 
the importance of separating firms’ self-interested versus 
other-focused orientation from the levels of firms’ normative 
and sociopolitical legitimacy when specifying the corporate 
opportunity structure for socially oriented shareholder activ-
ism. On the other hand, our theorizing on the specific way 
in which the socially responsible investment fund activist 
identity alters the corporate opportunity structure proved 
only partially accurate. One possible explanation for the 
surprising positive moderating effect of socially responsi-
ble investment fund identity on the technical CSP—socially 
oriented shareholder activism relationship is that socially 
responsible investment funds tend to invest primarily in 
firms with strong social identities, whereas other types of 
potential activists, like pension funds, are not so particu-
lar. As a result, socially oriented shareholder activism initi-
ated by socially responsible investment funds may be more 
likely than socially oriented shareholder activism initiated 
by non-socially responsible investment funds at firms with 
high technical CSP because socially responsible invest-
ment funds are more likely to own stock in high-technical 
CSP firms. While a mere speculation, we hope that future 
research will explore this further. Tests of Hypotheses 5–6 
thus show the importance of considering the heterogeneity 
in activists’ characteristics, including, identity when theoriz-
ing on activists’ motivations and target selection processes.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
As with any study, ours has limitations that creates oppor-
tunities for future research. First, while we studied firms’ 
stakeholder orientation  and social legitimacy as key 
antecedents of socially oriented shareholder activism, 
we acknowledge other potentially interesting factors that 
affect socially oriented shareholder activism. For example, 
firms that were a target of a prior customer boycott or a 
public activism campaign might be more or less receptive 
to subsequent socially oriented shareholder activism. This 
offers an interesting avenue for future research. As noted 
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before, the presence of a corporate opportunity structure 
is likely to be viewed positively by activists in targeting 
a firm. However, if firms have been targets of prior activ-
ism, how does that affect such firms’ need to comply with 
subsequent activist campaigns? That is, what are some of 
the other key factors that can affect firms’ social legiti-
macy? Moreover, given the varied tactics activists use to 
pursue their agenda, does the use of any one type of tactic 
help predict not merely the likelihood of a repeat activist 
campaign against the firm but also the type of tactic to be 
used? We look forward to seeing future research utilizing 
the corporate opportunity structure framework in address-
ing these questions.
Second, given our focus on unpacking the factors that 
affect socially oriented shareholder activists’ selection of 
target firms, we focused on firm level factors that are likely 
to be more salient to activists’ screening process. As such, 
our theorizing did not consider the effect of leaders’ char-
acteristics also acting as potent markers of firms’ corporate 
opportunity structures (e.g. Briscoe et al, 2014). However, 
we see fruitful opportunities for future studies that can 
specify various CEO and board level characteristics that 
can affect how firm level factors are assessed by activists. 
Specifically, the signals from characteristics of firms’ CEO 
or directors can potentially substitute or complement the 
signals activists infer from firms’ technical and institu-
tional CSP.
Finally, our sample is comprised of US-listed firms. 
Research has suggested that firms’ engagement with stake-
holders and shareholder responses to socially oriented ini-
tiatives differ across countries (Maignan & Ralston, 2002). 
As such, the generalizability of our findings may be lim-
ited to US-listed firms. We see promise in future research 
examining the applicability of our framework in the con-
text of other cultural and institutional contexts that not 
only differ in their emphasis on social issues but also vary 
in their evaluation of firms’ responses to such concerns.
Conclusion
Despite decades of research on the firm-activist relationship, 
social activists’ selection of target firms against whom to 
launch a campaign remains under examined. In this study, 
we sought to answer this question by developing salient 
dimensions for the concept of corporate opportunity struc-
ture, and demonstrated their empirical validity in the con-
text of firms’ CSP attracting subsequent socially oriented 
shareholder activism. We hope our findings will spur interest 
among scholars to further explore this important domain.
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